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RICHARD E. AQUILA. *Representational Mind: A Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984. Pp. xiii + 206. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-253-35005-0.

In this impressive and stimulating new book, Richard Aquila argues for a 'phenomenalist' interpretation of Kant. But the phenomenalism he attributes to Kant is considerably more sophisticated than the traditional view — i.e., the view which holds that Kant believed 'sensations' were the immediate objects of apprehension, and that consciousness of objects resulted from the synthesis of such subjective states. For Aquila, taking his cues from Brentano, and the work of Sellars and Prauss, the object of awareness is best described as an 'intentional object,' an object that 'exists' only qua object of intention, and that is only possibly identical with that non-intentional 'real' object to which it is related in some appropriately causal way. Moreover, we would misdescribe such an object if we considered it as some mental object to which the mind was somehow 'related.' The second major feature of Aquila's interpretation is that he regards intentional consciousness as consisting in 'cognitive states,' which states have a representational capacity by virtue of components of *those states*, and not by virtue of a relation between those states and something else (either a mental or real object). Finally, Aquila argues that his interpretation is superior to what has become the dominant non-phenomenalist reading of Kant — the 'two aspect' view, which holds that things in themselves and appearances are always two aspects of one thing, not two distinct entities. Aquila disagrees and claims that, far from being identical, a thing in itself 'exists' in a way totally different from the existence of *Erscheinungen* (his 'intentional' objects).

After a historical chapter which describes various theories of representation prior to Kant (and which appropriately highlights Leibniz's theory of cognitive states that are 'internally' representational without being relational), Aquila begins his account with the problem of intuitions. Here he challenges a number of standard interpretations of Kantian intuitions. He follows Sellars in arguing that intuitions must have a minimally conceptual component in their role of making possible a reference to a singular object (this-such an object, as inhabiting a possible region of space, about which we might have something to claim in a judgment). Throughout, the approach is phenomenological, an account of the conditions necessary for us to be aware of an object about which we make judgments, and not the conditions for

judging that such and such is the case. The pure form of intuition (in outer sense) informs a representation by constituting 'it as the awareness, either sensory or imaginative, of an at least possibly real region of space.' It is 'ideal' for Aquila in that the affection relation itself between object and sensor is not sufficient to establish 'empirical intuition *de re*,' a cognitive state capable, by virtue of its own qualities, of representing a (possibly real) object. When this formal, subjective component is considered independently of any sensory contribution, we can determine the 'constraints' on our powers of representation, and can argue that since such limitations and/or capacities are inherent in 'the very factors setting up an intentional reference to some object in the first place,' then these purely determined factors count as characteristics of 'regions of space themselves, at least as intentional objects.' (It might be noted at this point that Aquila has stressed the 'singularity' condition for any state being an intuition, almost to the exclusion of the 'immediacy' condition; that the presence of a 'minimally' conceptual component in intuition further clouds the immediacy issue; that his account of mathematical construction, with a concept being 'applied' to a region of space leaves unclear how that concept itself is constructed — see A713/B741 on the construction of concepts — and a non-question begging explanation of how we know which 'intentional' objects *are* 'real' objects begins to look difficult.)

The fourth chapter, on idealism, is the core of Aquila's analysis. He makes quite a good point against some double-aspect theorists. To those who would argue that the limitation of knowledge to appearances only means that the objects characterized by concepts *are* objects only *in* relation to a subject, that, when considered apart from any possible such relation, they are unknowable things in themselves, Aquila responds that Kant did not only regard conceptualized objects as appearances, but the objects presented in intuition (to be conceptualized) were also 'appearances' and that *these* appearances could not exist apart from a subject (making it doubtful that considering them apart from a subject could yield any result) (A42/B59). Then he argues for a 'double existence,' not double aspect view of things in themselves. His specific case, though, against those who claim a double-aspect 'identity' between things in themselves and appearance, relies everywhere on his own 'intentional object' phenomenalism (his claim that empirical reality 'is defined in terms of relations among the members of whole sets of the objects of perceptions considered purely intentionally ...'). Aquila accepts the odd consequence of this view: that persons are 'composites,' not one being that can be viewed from phenomenal and noumenal perspectives; in this case a composite of a subject existing in itself, and a particular phenomenal object. He does not, though, much discuss the arguments that might justify actually thinking of us in such a way.

In chapter five, concepts are defined not as introspectible entities, but 'aspects' of mental activity itself, and there is, as there has been throughout the work, a tendency to define that activity indirectly: concepts are *that in virtue of which* an awareness of something is recognized as a 'treelike thing' (though we never hear much about the 'that'). There is a good discussion of

synthesis that explains Kant's notion of synthetic unity without introducing a pre-conscious synthetic act, and Aquila continues his attempt to 'link' concepts and intuitions more closely than in standard accounts (at one point sounding like a Leibnizean in distinguishing them on the basis of *relative* clarity, arguing that a conceptual determination brings to light and makes explicit in judgment a conceptual component already part of an empirical intuition).

In the last chapter, Aquila turns to the topic of self-awareness. Here his interpretation faces a difficult test, since it's always been hard to understand why Kant says we know ourselves only as appearances. His argument is too complex to summarize here, but its conclusion is that Kantian 'inner sense' is the awareness 'in a special way' of appearances already present in outer intuition. Thus he has to try to find a way of construing such appearances in terms of the intentional object language introduced earlier. This means that what seems to me to be a 'succession' of my intuitions can be an appearance only if my awareness is of a possible succession that could (or could not) turn out to be (really) a succession in me. I confess I fail to see how there could be such a distinction, and I thought more attention was required to distinctions like (a) empirical judgments about me (b) the unconceptualized objects of inner sense (c) transcendental apperception and (d) a noumenal representation of me. All in all, though, an exciting book, likely to be much discussed.

ROBERT B. PIPPIN

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O.K. BOUWSMA. *Without Proof or Evidence*. Ed. J.L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1984. Pp. xiv + 161. US\$19.50. ISBN 0-832-1174-0.

One of many nice examples of Bouwsma at his best occurs in 'Reflections on Moore's Recent Book' (*Philosophical Papers*, University of Nebraska Press 1969, p. 132). In the course of explaining the sense in which Moore wanted to 'give a description of the whole universe,' Bouwsma has us imagine Gulliver, or Robinson Crusoe, returning home and reporting that where he had been, 'there were enormous numbers of material objects, and many acts of consciousness.' He has someone shouting from the back of the crowd 'What! No tobacco, no melons ... no grass twenty foot high?' Such subtlety and charm

earned Bouwsma many admirers, including myself. The writings collected here will not, I fear, add to his reputation.

They are: 'Faith, Evidence and Proof,' 'The Invisible,' 'Anselm's Argument,' 'Notes on Kierkegaard's "The Monstrous Illusion",' 'Miss Anscombe on Faith,' 'Adventure in Verification,' 'An Introduction to Nietzsche's Letters,' 'Lengthier Zettel,' 'A Lengthy Zettel,' 'Myth and the Language of Scripture,' and 'The Biblical Picture of Human Life.' The 'Zettel' pieces are not about Wittgenstein's *Zettel*. With the exception of the introduction to Nietzsche's letters, which was commissioned for an edition of the letters, but not used, they all have to do primarily with religion. (Bouwsma is described in the Introduction as 'a lifelong lover of the reformed church.') Most of the pieces were written to be read at conferences and colloquia. Four of them were previously published.

I found the first paper interesting, and thought the third started promisingly, but soon began to flounder and go fuzzy. Others were at best of little interest, and at worst painful to read. 'Adventure in Verification' I found just awful. It described with a wealth of tedious detail some imaginary ancient Greek's investigations of whether there were gods having themselves a divine time on Mount Olympus. The details contributed nothing to the philosophical point of the story, and it was anyone's guess what that point was. Here is an excerpt:

He was well satisfied. He had seen for himself. He had verified. "What! No Zeus? Don't be silly. I've been there." ... So he returned to the city. It was still dark and the marketplace was deserted. All the chess tables were empty. He crossed over by the way of Ajax Lane to Agamemnon Boulevard, and so home. He was in high spirits. Tired as he was, physically that is, he did not immediately "hit the straw." This expression, which was in common use in those days, quite different from our own "hit the hay," has in recent years been regarded as reflecting the state of the economy at that time... (104)

In 'Faith, Evidence and Proof,' the only piece I care to discuss, Bouwsma suggests that we are as it were in an enclosure, in the walls of which are various dummy doors. We all wonder what is beyond the enclosure, and some of us pry and batter at the doors. Sometimes one of us thinks he has opened a door a little and caught a glimpse of what is beyond, but in fact this is impossible, because the doors really are all dummies. Some of us try to make inferences from what is inside our enclosure to what is beyond, but such inferences are always unsound. They would work only if we sometimes knew of correlations between what is inside and what is outside. Then in particular cases we could reckon that since usually when there is *this* inside, there is *that* outside, there now being *this* inside, there will probably be *that* outside. But since we *never* know what is outside, we lack the foundation necessary for this reasoning.

If there is thus no prospect of evidence or proof, where do the devout stand? Bouwsma suggests that they are essentially in the position of Abraham,

Moses and Saul. He dwells on the biblical stories of these men's encounters with the deity, stressing that they did not size up the evidence as to whose voice they were hearing, and decide that since it appeared to be God's, they had better obey. Rather, God spoke and they obeyed. 'To Abraham God said "Go," and Abraham went. To Moses God said "Now therefore go," and Moses went. To Saul Jesus said "Rise and enter the city," and Saul arose' (10). Moses, hearing a voice from a burning bush, had every reason to be sceptical. 'The Maker of the whole world and all the stars having a rendez-vous with a dusty keeper of his father-in-law's sheep'? (10) Come now! But Moses went. 'It is a mistake,' Bouwsma says, 'to regard Saul as believing at one moment, and obeying the next — as though he then said "Well, I had better"'. People are 'called of God,' and when that happens, the doubts they might otherwise have simply do not enter the picture.

But now, remembering about the impenetrable wall of the enclosure, do they nevertheless believe something about what lies beyond? Bouwsma's style of writing here leaves it unclear whether he is addressing this problem, but some things he says may be intended as a way of dealing with it.

(i) He dwells on the way Saul, in right away calling his interlocutor 'Lord,' *became* a servant (12), and here he may be suggesting that to believe just is to become as it were a servant, or to acquire a mission. (In other places in the book he says similar things. On p. 78 he asks 'How is "I am a Christian" to be understood?', and replies 'I think as a vow, as a pledge.' And on p. 134 he says '*What is eternal life?* It is a form of engagement, a struggle, a striving.' [Does that make any sense?])

(ii) He suggests further that to believe is to regard the world differently. A believer 'looks out upon the heavens and hears them declare the glory of God,' 'sees the firmament declare God's handiwork.' For him, 'the hills are girded with joy ... the floods clap their hands ... the hills sing for joy together' (12-13). On the face of it there are two rather different lines of thought here, but perhaps Bouwsma means that to talk of the glory of God and of God's handiwork are ways of saying that the hills seem to sing for joy together etc. (See also p. 48, where 'We believe that thou art a being than which none greater can be conceived' is treated as being absurd in the way that 'We believe that we are glad and sing for joy' is.)

But don't those who are called of God believe that beyond the wall there is God, and that it is He who called them? Their acquiring of a mission is not like becoming fascinated by biochemistry and feeling that one must devote one's life to it. That mission is not thought of as having been assigned by anyone. And the person for whom the heavens declare the glory of God is not just full of wonder, but believes that he heavens are God's handiwork, and is amazed.

Bouwsma seems at one point to be agreeing, although again I am not at all sure what his position is. On p. 11, after reflecting on how improbable it was that a dusty shepherd should become the confidant and plenipotentiary of the Most High, he notes that still, Moses believed this; and he continues 'I am writing as though I knew something, but I am writing only of what is human-

ly possible. Belief is possible.' It is difficult to be sure what to make of this, but I will treat it as an argument that what is believed here must at least be intelligible, since believing it is demonstrably possible, and one cannot believe what is unintelligible.

If this is the intended point, it is not a good one. It is true that one cannot say 'This is unintelligible, but I believe it,' but one can believe what is in fact unintelligible. If I tell someone it is five o'clock on the sun, he may show that he believes this by repeating it matter-of-factly, saying that it will not be midnight on the sun for another seven hours, and so on; but that would not show that what he believes is intelligible.

So while I think it is a worthy point, made in vintage Bouwsma style, that in religion it is a mistake to look for evidence or proof, it is a point that generates problems about what kind of sense to make of religion, and I found Bouwsma's handling of these problems neither clear nor promising.

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University of Toronto

ROBERT D'AMICO. *Marx and Philosophy of Culture*. Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida 1981. Pp. viii + 108. US\$7.00. ISBN 0-8130-0689-9.

The thesis of this book is unclear, since D'Amico argues for at least three different ones.

One of these theses involves D'Amico's idea that 'for Marx, labor is a philosophical rather than an economic concept' (2). *Labour* is equated with *all human activity*. From here D'Amico wants to argue that according to this *philosophical* understanding of the concept of labour, we cannot read Marx as putting forward historical materialism (see, e.g., 2, 3, 7, 10, 11). But this argument fails since D'Amico makes it rely on the clearly incorrect assumption that historical-materialist accounts require the economy to be unalterable by human activity (10, 11). D'Amico does not stop here in criticizing attempts to read Marx as a historical materialist. Throughout his book he produces many other such 'arguments' (1, 12, 13, 17, 23, 73, 79, 84, 89). None of these are convincing. (E.g., one of D'Amico's recurring complaints is that historical materialism is *reductive* in the sense that it claims that the superstructure is not real (3, 11).)

We might think that D'Amico is aware that his arguments against historical-materialist readings of Marx are weak, since in a few places he argues for a different thesis which does not involve the assertion that historical materialism is wrong. In one place (2) he makes the different claim that his idea that Marx did not use 'labor' as having an economic sense is an 'assumption.' D'Amico later (87) recognizes that he may not be right in making this assumption; he there writes that if this assumption were wrong, he would then claim that it is at least *possible* to read Marx as putting forward a Marxism *sans* historical materialism. The assumption is, of course, wrong (see *Capital*, vol. 1, chap. 13). Thus we should here read D'Amico as arguing for the thesis that it is possible to get out of Marx a theory (D'Amico's 'theory of cultural forms' [18]) devoid of historical-materialist claims. This is an interesting thesis and worth pursuing.

In the final pages (87-93) D'Amico is arguing for a third thesis. This is the thesis that we not only *can* but *should* read Marx as putting forward this 'theory of cultural forms' instead of any theory which includes historical-materialist claims. This argument is not successful. D'Amico first repeats some of his unconvincing arguments against historical materialism. He then produces a new argument which claims that his theory is superior since it does not claim to be scientific (89). However, this argument will persuade only those who believe that it is a mistake to subscribe to a Marxist theory which includes scientific claims.

We have seen that D'Amico does a poor job of arguing for two of his theses. How does he fare with the one thesis which seems promising? Not very well, since it is unclear exactly what is the nature of D'Amico's 'theory of cultural forms.' It seems to involve the following ideas. Objectification in economic activity is similar to objectification in culture, and the link between the economy and culture is a result of this similarity (13). The separation between the economy and culture is an effect of the commodity-form (which is the form of commodities) (31). The way to understand exploitation, concealment, and mystification in society is by looking at fetishism and reification in the objectification of the commodity-form (14, 23, 27). One of the main ways in which exploitation and fetishism occurs is by concealing the fact that societies produce desires in people that are compatible with the current mode of production (30, 53, 59). And the commodity-form in capitalism helps to free 'labor from religious, familial, or social customary limitations' (29, 61).

There may be more to this 'theory of cultural forms.' D'Amico devotes a lot of space to discussing various ideas of Levi-Strauss, Jean Joseph Goux, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Jean Baudrillard, and others, but often does not make it clear what relationships these discussions have to his theory.

There certainly should be more to this 'theory of cultural forms.' For example, D'Amico does not say how the commodity-form distinguishes between the economy and culture. What is the nature of the relationship between certain modes of production and certain sorts of desires? I also wish D'Amico had said how the various claims that constitute his 'theory of cultural forms' are to be related to each other. It is true that in explicating this

theory, D'Amico has touched on some interesting issues, such as the question of the relationship between desires and modes of production; unfortunately, about these issues nothing he says is both new and unobvious.

This book is difficult to read since (a) it lacks structure, (b) D'Amico often does not write clearly or seem to know what he is arguing for, and (c) a fair bit of unelucidated continental jargon is used. And once the reader has finally determined what it is D'Amico is trying to say, he will remain disappointed with this book because of the superficial way in which D'Amico deals with arguments and issues.

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MAX DEUTSCHER. *Subjecting and Objecting: an Essay in Objectivity*. Don Mills and New York. Oxford University Press 1983. Pp 281. Cdn\$49.95 ISBN 0-631-13404-2

The objectivity forming the main topic of this rambling essay is not the property occasionally ascribed to facts or truth (an attribution Deutscher finds either redundant or empty [132-6]), but rather the quality of mind and character credited with increasing the likelihood of the correctness of our opinions, rendering us fair in our judgments, balanced in our emotions, responsible for — rather than victimized by — our feelings, and sensitive in our tastes (42). A preponderant share of the discussion is devoted to showing that there is *one* psychological source, or a related cluster of sources, that both accounts for these various 'intellectual, moral, emotional and sensual virtues' and is naturally describable as objectivity. This is attempted through a concrete exploration of character traits in specific circumstances. (Sometimes the description is too local. Types and their failings are described in terms of the social and political problems currently common in English-speaking countries. Can't Burmese be or fail to be objective? Couldn't medieval scholars?)

A central claim is that objectivity is not in conflict with subjectivity, but involves it. The author criticizes those who attempt to treat knowledge, or any other subject-matter involving objectivity, without paying due attention to the fact that it is subjects who do the cognizing. He mentions a number of diverse ways in which subjects are involved in knowledge, and briefly ac-

cuses Plato and Popper of seeking to remove the cognizing subject. Nevertheless, there is little to indicate how any particular epistemological doctrine, even if it fails to mention these facts, has neglected subjectivity. Perhaps Deutscher is not concerned with specific claims, but with a reorientation of the whole subject. But here too it is unclear in what direction his accumulation of facts points.

The subsumption of objectivity under subjectivity means that various attitudes normally associated with the lack of objectivity deserve re-evaluation. Thus Deutscher argues that being committed — rather than detached — partial, warm, active and passionate are in their places requirements of objectivity. For example, objectivity requires detachment only *within* commitment. He attempts to show — once again *via* detailed descriptions of realistic scenarios — that the situation is much more complex than traditional dichotomies suggest. Even vices such as vanity, narcissism, conceit, arrogance, envy and malice are merely excesses of character traits which are in themselves essential to objectivity.

Deutscher warns against distortions of objectivity, subjectivity and attendant notions. (When abused otherwise respectable 'ity's, such as liberality and authority, may be transformed into all-consuming 'isms', such as liberalism and authoritarianism. Such a misappropriation is also called 'totalitarianism' and 'reductionism'.) The culprits warranting his extended treatment are Christianity (despite its misleading suffix), Marxism and physicalism. Several objections in a Wittgensteinian vein are brought against physicalism, as also against dualism and Cartesian scepticism. But the author also warns us against embracing physicalism's opposite error, idealism, which is roundly criticized in its Berkeleian incarnation. The antidote to reductionisms that recognize only a single kind of ultimate reality is not anti-realism, but a 'plural realism' (202) that embraces all the distinct perspectives and aims from which we may approach our commonly shared reality.

Despite the critique of what he calls 'objectivism,' and the reintroduction of the cognizing subject into epistemology, Deutscher is by no means an advocate of cognitive relativism. He dismisses as senseless the suggestion of relative truth, believes it a virtue rather than a vice provisionally to stick by our own well-thought out views and conceptual schemes when confronted by exotic alternatives, and does not think that understanding another's view need amount to accepting it or forgiving others' transgressions against moral injunctions to which we firmly adhere.

Although the book contains some exploration of familiar analytic topics and views, discussion seems tilted toward phenomenological description. Indeed, even the analytic material doesn't get its customary treatment. For example, with respect to physicalism Deutscher tells us that he is not attempting to analyse its errors, but 'to characterize the outlook, the false consciousness' of the view. He does this repeatedly for various similarly extensive outlooks. However, he also offers his results as reasons for rejecting the views so characterized; thus abandoning moral psychology for the less creditable practice of *ad hominem* argument.

Deutscher provides readers with many opportunities for disliking his book; too many I believe to be overcome by the book's virtues. First, the book is rife with baldly enunciated personal prejudices. They are so carelessly interjected that their presentation is likely to be an embarrassment even to those who share them. Second, critical passages are sometimes hysterical invective. (There is much to criticize in Reagan's politics, but simply labelling them 'cowboy facism' is more cathartic for the author than illuminating for his readership. And we may find similarly unenlightening epithets for leftist views that Deutscher dislikes. Doesn't an author, who is after all asking that the public pay close attention to an extended discussion of his views, owe his readership more than his immediate visceral reaction to an issue?) Third, Deutscher's prose style is baroque, often bordering on the gushy. The sentence structure is occasionally headache-producing, which may help explain why the book contains many proofreading errors. Fourth, the psychological description often falls flat. There are numerous clichés, instances in which the author seems to have uncritically accepted a snappy slogan rather than thoroughly exploring an issue, and some cases of badly amateurish psychoanalysis (such as that anti-Communists have 'a repressed desire for Communism and . . . envy of those who can so far kick over the traces of reason,' and *mutatis mutandis* for 'anti-' anythings). Fifth, Deutscher is not above running together logical, psychological, conceptual and moral difficulties for a view, as if they are solid reasons of a single kind for declaring it unworthy. (Is the offensiveness of psychological egoism enough reason to reject it?) Sixth, an attitude may be reviled as inexcusable in one place, while a justification (or excuse) for it may be provided in another. (Compare the rejection of all motives for dogmatism, 104-5, with the later proviso that economies of time should persuade one to adopt an attitude which is in fact indistinguishable from the one earlier described as dogmatic, 170.)

This is by no means the whole story. The book contains a number of important corrections of misuses of our evaluative vocabulary regarding objectivity; and there are occasional flashes of insight. Moreover, the discussions of reductionism, physicalism, Marxism and Christianity, are thought provoking, and the treatment of Cartesian certainty and Berkeleyan idealism in chapter 10 are worthy of special note. (Ironically, although Descartes seems to be the most frequently discussed historical figure, his name isn't listed in the index.) However, these do not appear to me to counter-balance the book's considerable shortcomings. A reader must plough through too much commonplace observation and dubious psychoanalysis to find the randomly scattered gems.

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DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI *The Philosophy of Vegetarianism* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1984 Pp. 194. US\$20.00 (cloth ISBN 0-87023-430-7); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87023-431-5)

This is not, as the title suggests, a discussion of the philosophy of vegetarianism. Rather, it is a historical survey which is principally concerned with vegetarian thought in ancient Greece and its echoes in Rome. The author is widely read in recent discussions of vegetarianism, and provides an annotated bibliography in which he gives thumbnail sketches of many pro- and anti-vegetarian writings. But he contributes little to the philosophical debate.

Chapter One, Introduction, asks why vegetarianism 'died'. It contains the standard diatribes against the 'Judeo-Christian tradition' ('speciesist', 9), Descartes ('the absolute nadir,' 11), and Kant. Bentham and Darwin are also criticized for failing 'to consistently follow their own arguments to their logical conclusions' (14) since neither was a vegetarian.

Chapter Two discusses the idea of a 'Golden Age,' accounts of which often feature vegetarianism, usually of an idyllic nature: 'the fertile earth for them spontaneously yields abundantly her fruit' (Hesiod).

In Chapter Three, Dombrowski discusses Pythagoras' vegetarianism and claims that it has a 'distinctly modern character' (46) on the ground that Pythagoras attributed soul and reason to animals.

Chapter Four is concerned with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. Dombrowski finds vegetarian leanings in Plato, which lead him to suggest that 'Plato's desire to sustain vegetarian theory represents a plea to return to the richer Greek conception of man as a social being not intelligibly removable from his fellows or his natural environment — which includes besouled, sentient animals' (63). But it is just as likely that Plato thought the eating of flesh might encourage our 'bestly' (*theriodes*) nature. Dombrowski apparently believes that because meat-eating manifests a belief in our superiority to animals, vegetarianism must manifest a belief in our equality to them. Not so.

Aristotle is castigated for being a speciesist as well as a sexist and a racist (Dombrowski makes it clear, p. 9, that he regards these as morally equivalent), and for saying in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (not 'Nichomachean' as Dombrowski has it) that light meats are digestible (!). On the other hand Aristotle's student Theophrastus is commended for his vegetarian views.

In Chapter Five Dombrowski discusses the 'Stoic denigration of animals' (81). He dismisses their contractarian views (which placed animals outside the sphere of morality) chiefly on the ground that sentience is sufficient, and rationality not necessary, for moral status. Also in this chapter Dombrowski discusses Roman attitudes to animals. After quoting Lecky's account of the Roman games in imperial times Dombrowski asks: 'How can the nonvegetarian consistently object to these Roman practices regarding animals?' (85). Since the quoted remarks describe the torture of Christians as well as cruelty to animals this rhetorical question is, to say the least, inept.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of Plutarch's vegetarianism and his treatise 'Of Eating the Flesh.'

In chapter Six the major figures are Plotinus and Porphyry, Plotinus' pupil and without doubt the star of ancient vegetarianism. Dombrowski notes that Porphyry's work *De Abstinence* was translated into English by Thomas Taylor who used some of Porphyry's ideas in his 1792 book *A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes*, a reply to Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*. 'Taylor suggests that if women are given rights, eventually even the beasts will receive them, thereby, he thinks, reducing the women's case to absurdity' (107). Another link between speciesism and sexism!

In reply to the Stoic argument that it is inconsistent to eat plants but not animals, Porphyry argues that animals, but not plants, can feel pain and hence can be wronged. He further argues that it is irrational and absurd, 'since we see that many of our own species live by sense alone, but do not possess intellect and reason, . . . that no justice is shown by us to the ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed by us, and the animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn our bodies with their wool'. As Dombrowski notes (78), Porphyry is here employing both the 'argument from sentience' and the 'argument from marginal cases', i.e., the argument that there is no differentia which distinguishes all humans from all other animals ('To appeal to the differentia of 'being human' is 'speciesist.'')

In Chapter Seven Dombrowski argues that 'vegetarianism is a duty' and therefore is not supererogatory though it may require 'heroism' (126). The book concludes with a criticism of Richard Rorty and a commendation of Charles Hartshorne. Perhaps Rorty was trying to rile vegetarians when he wrote that 'pigs don't writhe in quite the right humanoid way, and the pig's face is the wrong shape for the facial expressions which go with ordinary conversation. So we send pigs to slaughter with equanimity' (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 190). Dombrowski is duly riled. Rorty claims that 'moral prohibitions against hurting babies and the better looking (!) sorts of animals' are 'expressions of a sense of community based on the imagined possibility of conversation, and the attribution of feelings is little more than a reminder of these prohibitions' (*ibid.*). The obvious objection to this is that the 'imagined possibility of conversation' is not fundamental, as Rorty supposes, but itself derivative from the biological and behavioural similarities between us and other creatures.

As this summary suggests, Dombrowski's book is wide-ranging although it is not long (139 pages of text). It provides a useful introduction to Greek and Roman thought on vegetarianism.

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JAMES FISHKIN. *Beyond Subjective Morality: Ethical Reasoning and Political Philosophy* New Haven: Yale University Press 1984 Pp vii + 201. \$US22 00. ISBN 0-300-03048-7.

Fishkin's admirable little book is of considerable interest on two separate fronts. One relatively parochial interest has to do with the theories and techniques of the moral psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. The other is the broader, more familiar issue of the status of moral judgements. But while Fishkin's discussion of both themes is rewarding, illuminating and splendidly clear, in the end his book attempts too much too quickly.

Fishkin's strategy is first to distinguish seven theoretical positions, ranging from Absolutism at one extreme to Amoralism at the other; then to identify six arguments, and six requirements, which support a generally subjectivist position in ethics; then to show how these arguments derive from three basic difficulties for an objectivist ethics, and finally to argue that the difficulties do not arise for a moderate objectivist position, which Fishkin calls Minimal Objectivism. Minimal Objectivism is thus a defensible objectivism, relatively immune — indeed sympathetic — to the difficulties which incline increasing numbers of people, and especially undergraduates, towards subjectivism. It performs a sort of balancing act between the objectivist claims of traditional morality, and the subjectivist tendency of contemporary moral scepticism.

Moreover Minimal Objectivism can provide an escape from a Kohlbergian cul-de-sac. The most distinctive feature of the book is its use of a cross-section of non-professional, though still predominantly student, opinion to illustrate its various theoretical positions and arguments. Fishkin thus nicely demonstrates how Kohlbergian moral interview data can be used to illustrate categories of moral thought other than those analysed by Kohlberg himself. But Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning also makes a number of extreme philosophical claims, which have not been modified in the face of obvious philosophical objections, and Fishkin provides not just a critique but a diagnosis of Kohlberg's errors.

A major difficulty for Kohlberg is the appearance, in relatively sophisticated moral thinkers, of a form of subjectivism or relativism which they ought in theory to have left far behind. What this suggests, of course, is that something is wrong with the theory; and what Fishkin shows is that this form of subjectivism is both more consistent and more defensible than Kohlberg allows, more defensible indeed than Kohlberg's own extreme objectivism. Kohlberg's mistake is to think that to be objective, ethics has to be absolute and inviolable, but here too a compromise is possible, a non-subjectivist ethics which does not go to Kohlbergian extremes. It is, of course, Minimal Objectivism.

So what is Minimal Objectivism? It agrees with various forms of subjectivism in accepting that moral judgements apply not merely to oneself but to others, and to everyone equally. But it goes beyond subjectivism, without claiming that moral judgements are absolute or inviolable, in claiming that

such judgements are objectively valid, 'that is, their consistent application to everyone is supported by considerations that anyone should accept, were he to view the problem from what is contended to be the appropriate moral perspective' (12). Suppose, for example, we use Rawls' original position to provide a decision procedure not just for judgements of justice, but for all moral judgements, but suppose also that we allow that there might be rival decision procedures producing different moral judgments, and with no conclusive argument that the Rawls procedure is the best or right one. This version of Rawls (it is not, of course, Rawls' own position, but Fishkin clearly thinks that it ought to be) would be a form of Minimal Objectivism: some moral judgements are justified or rationally supportable, in terms of a particular moral perspective, but this moral perspective cannot be demonstrated to be the correct or appropriate one.

The obvious objection to this compromise is that it is too obviously a compromise: since there is in the end no way of demonstrating that the particular perspective within which particular judgements are justified is the correct one, what Fishkin terms Minimal Objectivism might as easily be termed Minimal Subjectivism; a more accurate title for the book might be 'Between Objectivism and Subjectivism.' But the labels hardly matter, what matters is that it is possible to have a form of objectivism without being lead to the extremes of Rigorism and Absolutism, and a form of subjectivism without being lead to the extremes of Relativism, Personalism and Amoralism. Virtue, evidently, resides in the mean.

I strongly approve of this general approach. The traditional classifications of Objectivism and Subjectivism, Absolutism and Relativism, are too crude and too ambiguous. We do need a wider set of categories. But Fishkin's classification is still far too simplistic, running together any number of different issues.

To take one example. Insofar as Rawls believes that his decision procedure is demonstrably the right one, at least as regards judgements of justice, his position is stronger than Fishkin's Minimal Objectivism. In terms of Fishkin's classifications this ought to mean that Rawls is in this respect a Rigorist, believing that moral judgements do not admit of exceptions or *ceteris paribus* clauses. But it is far from obvious that Rawls is or needs to be a Rigorist in this sense. The question is not whether moral judgements can admit of exceptions — an issue on which Fishkin himself seems rather confused — but whether a particular moral perspective can be demonstrated as correct. Fishkin does not get clear in his mind, or in ours, whether the distinctive feature of Minimal Objectivism is that it allows reasoning but not proof, or that it allows exceptions to particular judgements. Nor are these the only issues to be conflated in the course of his wide-ranging discussion. Fishkin argues and writes with exemplary clarity, but his theoretical structure is, like Kohlberg's, too simple and too constrained for the enormous task he sets himself.

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CHARLES GUIGNON *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* Indianapolis. Hackett Publishing 1983. Pp 261 US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-9151-21-9); US\$12.75 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-62-6)

The title of this book may be a bit misleading. One is likely to expect a lengthy discussion of some small part of Heidegger's views and writings, or an attempt to press (often literally as well as figuratively) Heidegger into service in one of the standard problem areas of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. In fact what Guignon does, very skillfully, is to use the problem of knowledge as a focus for organizing a discussion of Heidegger's thought in its entirety and placing it in its proper historical perspective. Guignon correctly sees Heidegger's thought as rooted in the tradition of Hegel and most heavily indebted to Dilthey both for his hermeneutic approach to the study of man and his historicist orientation. He argues convincingly that an understanding of Dilthey's influence on Heidegger is crucial to understanding Heidegger's early view and its subsequent development. The book is one of only a few expositions and appraisals of Heidegger which place him squarely within the philosophical tradition he struggled to overcome and provide an account of his development from *Being and Time* to the last writings which makes the changes in his thought continuous and intelligible. This is certainly to Guignon's credit. The story line in abbreviated form is as follows.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger seeks the appropriate preliminary understanding with which to begin a hermeneutic investigation of metaphysics in general (in Heideggerian, the correct horizon within which to raise the question of Being). The first part of *Being and Time* (the only complete part) is an analysis of ordinary human existence, since it is part of the nature of human existence to be concerned with making something of itself and in that sense interpreting its own being. If the structure of all interpreting is hermeneutic — making manifest a meaning which is already there implicitly, deepening a pre-existing interpretation — human beings must already have some understanding of what it is to be. The problem is that the philosophical tradition has perverted the sense of everyday human existence by filtering it through the grid of a metaphysics which construes reality as consisting of private subjects representing and forming beliefs about a world of public objects. This perversion not only conceals the true meaning of human existence from us, it also gives rise to Cartesian skepticism, the traditional 'problem of knowledge.' Heidegger recovers the true sense of everyday human existence by shifting attention from theoretical passivity to ordinary practical activity. This reveals a culturally determined network of roles and goals which give everyday existence its significance, persons and things being understood in terms of their 'places' in this shared or public network of relations. The essential feature of human existence and its enterprise of self-interpretation turns out to be temporality or historicity. We make something of our lives by taking up inherited possibilities from the range presently available within our culture and preserving or transforming them as we move

toward the future. So time turns out to be the necessary horizon for the activity of interpretation and provides the clue for the appropriate investigation of Being in general. That investigation will have to be historical.

The second part of *Being and Time* was to have worked back through the history of metaphysics to find the deep insights into Being which are part of our heritage but which the tradition has distorted or covered over, the hidden springs at the source of Western European civilization which continue to flow beneath the surface of our modern misunderstandings. What Heidegger came to see, however, was that the historical situatedness and conditioning of all inquiry, even historical philosophical inquiry, undermines the ultimate project of metaphysics. There is no guarantee that the hermeneutic analysis of everyday human existence reveals *the* essential structures of human being, and no way for any investigation of the history of metaphysics from the particular historical context of any inquirer to guarantee that what it discovers is *the* essence of Being. Heidegger comes to see that just as there can be no a-historical inquiry or truth of the traditional sort, so there can be no trans-historical inquiry or truth of the sort attempted in *Being and Time*. The project of producing *the* fundamental ontology by correcting the metaphysical errors of the tradition joins the tradition as one more attempt to establish the truth once and for all.

At the end of the book Guignon suggests that in spite of the failure of *Being and Time* and the necessary abandonment of the traditional goals of metaphysics, there is much of value to salvage. He suggests that many of the transcendental arguments can be reconstrued as 'parasitism' arguments — with the resulting dependences as effective as the original arguments in dissolving traditional epistemological puzzles. And he points to a roughly pragmatic conception of truth emerging from *Being and Time* which would lead to a transformation not just in the point of metaphysical questions but in the being of the questioners as well.

As an account of what Heidegger was up to and why, the book is a tremendous success. As to the author's claims that Heidegger clearly wins at various points in his battle with the tradition, there is certainly room for disagreement. Husserl and phenomenism are lumped together much too easily in the opening chapter (28). The characterization of the tradition and 'Cartesianism' will strike many as oversimplified, ignoring important distinctions so as to set things up for Heidegger's sweeping attack. Few who have found the skeptical point of view powerful or attractive will be convinced that the various claims to ontological priority — of the practical to the theoretical, the active to the passive, or the cultural context of significance to individual human beings — entirely eliminate the relevant epistemological problems. For example, it is at best unclear how the claim that human beings 'are nothing but their expressions in the world' is to be understood so as to both be plausible and yet yield the conclusion that 'the other minds problem cannot get off the ground' because private subjects are not part of everyday human existence (107-81). It has certainly seemed to many philosophers that everyday phenomena like hiding one's feelings or portraying a role without

really living it are sufficient to produce the problem. The clash between Heidegger's picture and the traditional one, and some reasons for preferring Heidegger's, are clearly presented both here and elsewhere in the book. But the epistemological payoff does not seem to me to be quite as quick and easy as Guignon frequently suggests.

The book is not light reading, the going gets tough at many points. There is plenty of technical terminology — both Heidegger's own and that of others brought in to help with Heidegger's. There is no jargon for jargon's sake, however, and enough plain English and examples to get the point across to those who don't already have it. There is the usual and unavoidable problem with any very clear exposition of Heidegger's thought which is interspersed with brief passages from Heidegger's texts. Many of the quotations tend to remain quite dark in spite of the clarity of the purported paraphrases. The fault is Heidegger's, not Guignon's.

So that the importance of my critical remarks isn't exaggerated, I will comment briefly on the book as a whole. Its minor defects are dwarfed by its major accomplishments. Guignon's is the best book-length treatment of Heidegger with which I am familiar. It should be must reading for those unfamiliar with Heidegger's thought. For the rest, those unsympathetic to Heidegger would do well to read it to make sure they haven't done battle with a straw man. Those in sympathy with Heidegger's approach will need to read it before putting their views into print in the future to make sure that the job hasn't been done both earlier and better.

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ELIZABETH LABROUSSE. *Pierre Bayle*, trans. Denys Potts. Don Mills and New York: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. vi + 97. US\$12.95 (cloth ISBN 0-19-287541-8) Cdn\$3 95 (paper ISBN 0-19-287540-X).

The four volumes of Bayle's *Oeuvres Diverses* run to nearly four thousand pages *in folio*, and these do not include the famous *Dictionnaire*, which is nearly three-fourths as long. Nothing more than the barest account of Bayle's significance can be expected in this little book, which is part of Oxford's Past Masters series. Nor does the book make any radical additions to Bayle scholarship. Essentially it is a fair outline of Labrousse's monumental *Pierre Bayle* (1963-64) a work in two volumes that itself runs to close to a thousand pages.

The present book is however an excellent introduction to one of the most elusive figures in Western intellectual history.

Although generally acknowledged as important, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) suffers from being less read than talked about (and at that not very much). Especially among anglophones his significance has been restricted to his skepticism (linking Montaigne and Voltaire) and to related topics like fideism, the primary-secondary quality distinction, the rise of the Enlightenment, etc. Labrousse's contribution has been to insist that Bayle must also be understood in a religious tradition linking Calvin and Rousseau. She here follows her previous work by devoting the first half to a biography of Bayle that includes the religious background, the circumstances of his polemics, of his celebrated *Dictionnaire*, his journal *Les Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, etc. The second half discusses his views inter alia, his Cartesianism (restricted mainly to 1) a deviant use of the methodology and 2) his occasionalism cum dualism — Bayle consciously aspired more to Malebranchianism), his skepticism and fideism (especially with respect to such topics as the problems of evil), his anti-clericalism (which for Bayle is based on a prior duty to act according to conscience, with the result that toleration is for him a derived, not a primary value).

Labrousse, who knows more about Bayle than anyone in history, gives a sympathetic account both of Bayle, whom she successfully portrays as 'a fundamentally reasonable man of his times,' and of French Protestantism. Jurieu's extreme intolerance, for example, which occasioned his bitter disputes with Bayle, is excused as follows: 'Jurieu's extravagant ideas [as indeed they were] show how deep were the wounds the Revocation inflicted on the Huguenots, and for that reason they deserve better than mockery' (36). More convincingly, she exposes the weakness of arguments, nonetheless successfully advanced in the period, against toleration of Protestants.

Though a translation, Labrousse's book makes for a good read. It is generally non-technical, stylistically pleasing, and straightforward. The one problem I had in this last regard was her characterisation of the relation between Bayle's view of God and his adherence to occasionalism. Bayle's God is supposed to be the God of Abraham and Isaac, the God whose spirit bloweth where it listeth, but also one which is hidden — the transcendent object of faith rather than the object of philosophical reason. And Bayle is said to find occasionalism congenial because it excludes any suggestion that God is immanent in creation and not transcendent over it. But for Malebranche it seems to me, occasionalism supported just the opposite view, it is the causal component in his vision of all things in God, in whom we live and move and have our being. This is one point on which turning to her magnum opus, or perhaps even to Bayle himself, will not offer much help. On many other points, however, this is not so by any means, and a chief virtue of this book is that it should lead people to further profitable reading in and on Bayle.

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WILLIAM L. McBRIDE and CALVIN O. SCHRAG, eds. *Phenomenology in a Pluralistic Context* Albany: State University of New York Press 1983. Pp. vii + 313. US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-730-X), US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-731-8).

This volume contains twenty papers selected from three years of meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. With only a few exceptions, the articles are of high quality; indeed, several are brilliant and original. This book proves that phenomenology, at least in its existentialist form, is alive and well in America. I cannot possibly assess with any success the entire contents of the book, so I shall concentrate on some pervasive themes and problems.

Phenomenology has been criticized for its subjectivism (or idealism) and many of the book's contributors address this problem. The principal dilemma can be phrased in this way: How can contemporary phenomenologists eliminate Cartesianism from a philosophical method which Husserl founded with explicit indebtedness to Descartes? There has been a long-standing consensus that both Husserl and Sartre never escaped Cartesianism; indeed, contributor Robert R. Williams contends that 'Sartre is more philosophically conservative and more of a Cartesian than is Husserl. Sartre appropriates the Cartesian form of the phenomenological reduction presented by Husserl in the *Ideas* — which Husserl later criticized and rejected' (252-3).

On the other hand, there has been a widely-held opinion that both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty avoid the Cartesian trap. In his essay 'Marx and the Roots of Existential Social Thought,' Tom Rockmore takes exception to this view. He argues that Merleau-Ponty follows Sartre in the Cartesian 'belief that nothing external to me can restrict consciousness, because consciousness and being are different in kind' (106). Rockmore concedes that Merleau-Ponty's concept of a body-ego is superior to Sartre's radical dualism of *pour-soi* and *en-soi* (which Williams calls 'gnostic' [258]); nevertheless, Rockmore believes that Merleau-Ponty still retains the Cartesian notion that thinking is prior to action.

In his article Hans Seigfried proposes that Heidegger can be used to reverse this traditional bias of thinking over action. He suggests that if we read the later works in terms of *Being and Time*, then we must conclude that 'the pure responsiveness of the thinking of being is radically different from the purely contemplative character of traditional theory . . .' (71). In an amazingly candid admission, Seigfried suggests that the 'messages' of the later Heidegger are 'so disconcertingly vague and ambiguous, aside from being repulsive, and the grounds for accepting them so wanting, that one cannot help but be tempted to dismiss them as belonging to those "extravagances of genius" that Kant so justly criticizes at the end of this second critique' (70). Seigfried does not believe that this criticism is necessarily justified; but my opinion, after many years of struggle with the later Heidegger, is that this assessment is unfortunately correct.

Rockmore and the Czech philosopher Karel Kosik believe that it is Marx who offers the best corrective to the residual Cartesianism of contemporary phenomenology. While Seigfried attempts to demonstrate that Heidegger moves out of the contemplative tradition, Rockmore says that there is no question that Marx definitely reversed the priority of thinking over action. In introducing Kosik to many readers for the first time, Mildred Bakan explains that Kosik finds Heidegger's *Dasein* too passive. While not leaving Heidegger behind, Kosik makes *Dasein* into a working agent, actively transforming the world. In the process of doing this, Kosik must also correct Heidegger's bias against science and technology. Bakan contends that 'Kosik, by taking work as our primordial opening to the thing itself, is able to bridge the gap between meaning and causality that neither Husserl nor Heidegger can manage. Neither Huserl nor Heidegger has any place for the reality of things as a power on which we are dependent *and* of which we can nevertheless have knowledge' (88).

I have two reservations about Kosik's Marxist phenomenology. First, Kosik and all Marxists have to meet the challenge of critics who say that the definition of human beings as working beings is culture-bound. Many commentators believe that humankind is moving into a post-modern world in which proletarian work as Marx envisioned it will no longer be an essential component of human life. Second, contrary to Bakan's claim that in Kosik 'Marxism acquires a profoundly phenomenological dimension' (94), it seems to me that Kosik has moved outside of phenomenology proper, especially with his assumption of a real, independent reality. In so far as Kosik conceives of reality in terms of Spinoza's *natura naturans* (90), he is not only pre-phenomenological but pre-Marxian as well.

In what is probably the most original paper in the volume, James L. Marsh addresses the problem of subjectivism without leaving the phenomenological method. In a brief, but brilliant, analysis (Marsh should write a book on this), he proposes at least seven types of objectivity. Marsh then shows that the greatest fear among phenomenologists — turning the subject into a thing — is essentially baseless, primarily because they are not aware of the various ways of objectification. With their monolithic view of objectivity, phenomenologists and existentialists have uncritically agreed with Sartre that all 'looks' are necessarily alienating. Using straight-forward examples, Marsh shows that there are instances in which objectifying a subject is necessary, beneficial, or even liberating — e.g., a doctor's objectification of a broken leg and a person holding another in great esteem and reverence. Furthermore, Marsh argues, contrary to Heidegger, that not all objectifying thinking in science is necessarily a distortion or concealment of Being.

Not enough philosophy of religion is done from the phenomenological perspective, so Robert R. Williams's excellent article on Sartre and God is a welcomed addition to the literature. Williams reveals the Titanistic assumption in all theories of human autonomy — viz., if humans are actually self-

determining, self-sufficient, self-contained, and self-grounding, then they have paradoxically taken on the attributes of a divine being. If, as Sartre states, human beings 'rise in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is, without being able to be it' (quoted on p. 247), then Sartre has himself in a logical jam: either *pour-soi* is self-existent or it is not. If the former, then humans are a priori divine and not a 'useless passion', if the latter, then there is no ground whatever for humans to strive to become God.

With illuminating exposition Williams shows what a peculiar position Sartre's atheism is. Sartre holds that the non-thetic ego has a preontological comprehension of God, and that means that for Sartre consciousness at its roots is religious consciousness. Williams then goes on to argue that, contrary to his own intentions, Sartre cannot avoid embracing a traditional ontological argument for the existence of God. Furthermore, Williams proposes that the phenomenological method does not necessarily eliminate any investigation of the divine. Husserl makes it clear that the transcendental ego is only equiprimordial with the world; it is not the sole constitutive agent in the world. Presumably, this would leave theoretical room for the concept of God. Williams ends his article with a suggestive discussion of Schleiermacher as the first phenomenologist of religion.

Sartre is the philosopher most referred to in this collection of essays, usually as the brunt of criticism. Two exceptions to this are the papers of Linda A. Bell and Thomas R. Flynn. Drawing on Sartre's literary works, Bell proposes that the concept of play is the key for constructing a Sartrean ethic. All of us, according to Sartre, are doomed to playing roles, but some roles are better than others. For example, fainting to avoid a threat is a game that fails completely; indeed, as Bell states, 'fainting does not remove the threat but rather simply leaves the one who faints completely vulnerable, unable to resist or escape from the threat' (12). The authentic individual attempts to make himself invulnerable, and two of Sartre's protagonists, Hoederer and Genet, are given as examples. Using Kierkegaard, Bell also mentions the importance of comic relief in face of the absurd. I was reminded of Zarathustra's shepherd, who, after biting off the head of the snake of resentment, bursts out in what I call 'cosmic' laughter.

Flynn's essay on Sartre's political philosophy is another one of the volume's best. Of all those who attempt to reconcile the early and later Sartre, it is Flynn who does the best job. Although Sartre appropriated Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world in *Being and Nothingness*, he later admitted that he did not realize the full implications of this concept. Along with those whom I call 'dialogical' existentialists (Heidegger, Buber, Merleau-Ponty, and Marcel), Sartre finally realized that Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others means that the social atomism of classical liberalism (parallel to the Democritian atomism of Newtonian science) must be given up. After joining this with Marx's own critique of social atomism, substituting Marxian praxis for the negative and isolated *pour-soi*, the 'practico-inert' for the *en-soi*, and Marx's

'objective possibility' for Sartre's earlier unlimited possibility, Flynn claims that Sartre's philosophical transition is complete

Flynn also shows how Sartrean voluntarism subverts Kantian rationalism. Instead of a kingdom of ends, in which reason is 'king' and subtly dictates right action, Sartre proposes a 'city of ends,' in which all privileges are excluded and in which the command-obedience model (including reason's 'command') is eliminated. Flynn states that 'Sartre thereby joins Rousseau and Marx in promising an *anti political*, that is, an ideal society where power and authority are replaced by eye-level relationships based on reason and persuasion' (34). This all sounds very nice, except Flynn overlooks a basic problem in his exposition. Sartre is forced to conclude that Kant's purely good will must be now seen as a thoroughly tragic will, for there are instances in which people will have to 'dirty their hands' in order to bring about the ideal state. If Sartre really believes that 'political action can never be directed against the freedom of citizens' (quoted on p. 28), it is difficult to see how rich capitalists are going to be persuaded to give up their wealth for the libertarian socialism which Sartre envisions.

Space does not permit even summary discussion of the rest of the articles in this fine volume. The importance of some form of transcendental method for phenomenology is expertly discussed in two papers on Kant's 'proto-phenomenology' and J. N. Mohanty's excellent 'The Destiny of Transcendental Philosophy'. There is also a section devoted to the phenomenology of medicine in which some significant contributions of contemporary phenomenologists are presented. There are also good sections on aesthetics and language.

For me the most disappointing essay was one by David Levin, whose style of philosophizing is still found, unfortunately, among some contemporary phenomenologists. After introducing his essay with some obscure epigraphs from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Levin claims that these passages are 'examples of the kind of clarity, rigor, and accuracy we may find in the *best* of such [phenomenological] discourse ...' (216). Later on he declares that what is important for phenomenology is really a poetry of 'resonance, . . . ambiguity, [and] ... free elusiveness in descriptive meaning' (220); and he admits, directly contradicting earlier claims, that such a method 'eludes objective clarity and descriptive precision' (224). Levin descends into sheer aestheticism when he states that in reading Heidegger the right questions to ask are 'How do I feel about this?' 'Does it this feel right (good)?' 'What do I need to hear (next)?' (227). This 'feeling good' philosophy is connected with a fully romantic notion of the transcendental method, one which will presumably help us get to the depths of human experience instead of Husserl's 'surface' phenomenology.

I personally believe that this is phenomenology at its worst, and this is the type of philosophizing that makes contemporary phenomenologists easy prey for sharp analytic philosophers. After going through an early aesthetic stage during my graduate work with Heidegger, I have learned that we in the continental tradition must translate the significant achievements of Heidegger,

Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre out of their unique idioms into ordinary philosophical language. The great value in this book is that most of its authors have been successful in this necessary task.

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ALAN MONTEFIORE, ed *Philosophy in France Today* Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 1983. Pp. xxvi + 201. US\$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22838-7); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-29673-0).

Jean-Francois Lyotard cites four questions asked of the contributors to this collection: what the philosopher has 'said (= written)', what he believes to be the audience and the context of his writings; what he knows to be 'the objections, or possible objections to his writings and what he considers he should reply to these objections'; and what in his work presents the greatest difficulty to the French-speaking and non-French-speaking audience. The gulf between these questions and what most of the philosophers represented here actually do makes for a fascinating and enlightening book. In posing such questions, Montefiore gives the contributors exactly the stage they need. Metaphilosophy replaces any concern for specific issues where it would make sense to proceed by anticipating and facing objections. And the presence of such obvious editorial presuppositions gives force to the efforts by these thinkers to resist what seems to reduce most philosophy to a systematic practice unresponsive to this rhetorical, highly fantasized project of crossing borders and displaying one's claims to be taken seriously by, of all people, the mandarins of Anglo-American, 'real philosophy.'

There is considerable variety in this work: essays range from Jean-Toussaint Desanti's effort to ground ideal objects in history to Paul Ricoeur's magisterial retrospective essay on the forms of 'truth' hermeneutics can disclose. Nonetheless the occasion seems to release one dominant passion in contemporary French thought, produced by a Hegelian epistemology crossed with the spirit of demystification and the Bergsonian Faith in an other occluded by the representations or mediations necessary for knowledge to take form. Jean Francois Lyotard's formula captures both the theme and its historical context: 'What Hegel terms determination and which provides the

moving force of the passage from Being to non-Being is the situation of Being (or of presentation) in a sentential universe.' For what this entails as epistemology, I highly recommend Emmanuel Levinas' arguments that the belief in accurate representation requires constructing a model of agency bound to an impersonal sense of reflective reason as the true inner life: 'intentionality signifies an exteriority in immanence and the immanence of all exteriority.'

Most of the essays make reference to this epistemology only to concentrate instead on how the thinker might resist the closure of philosophy into rules and assumptions that do not, in Vincent Descombes' words, 'allow the noise of the world to make itself heard,' banning as barbarous or irrelevant the signs of desire that in fact make philosophy a worldly force. Descombes then suggests two basic ways of giving that noise a place in discourse, ways that allow us to map the rest of the volume. One strategy is populist, eliciting within philosophy the play of wills and forces that give philosophy a history; the other is literary, making manifest the noise of the speaker's body that situates philosophy as an act from the position of a desiring subject who, like Rousseau, is at once the agent and the victim of its rhetorical practices. Among populist strategies one may distinguish Pierre Bourdieu's pursuit of a freedom that comes from knowing how a practice is culturally determined, Pierre Machery's 'materialist' case for reading philosophy as a form of cultural production, and Louis Marin's brilliant exposition of how the contradictions between force and justice underly the relationship between power and discourse. Explorations of 'literary' strategies include Lyotard's play on the effects of rhetorical forms in revealing and concealing 'presentations,' Levinas's undermining of the self-sufficiency of representation to make evident the pressure imposed by the 'difference' of the other which makes the speaker seek existential justification, and Descombes own search for what the institution renders unnameable. (This concern for naming and expression also reveals the connection between the more radical thinkers and the largely phenomenological essays by Claude LeFort and Ricoeur.) Finally, Derrida, as usual, takes everything a step farther by casting his very important autobiographical essay as an examination of what it means to stand for examination in his 'last thesis defense.' Here epistemology opens on to the adventure of elaborating an ethics of responsibility for a writing which cannot claim to be subject either to truth conditions or the purposes of a coherent psychological agent.

One French analytic philosopher, Jacques Bouveresse, enters these lists. His reactions to the new movement will probably represent most Anglo-American readers, although all are likely to be quite impressed by the lucidity and verve of these particular essays. Bouveresse soars to elegant rhetorical heights, again and again, in castigating mainstream French work for its clichéd dismissals of analysis and its Gallic aptitude, in Nietzsche's words, '*for converting even the portentous crises of its spirit into something charming and seductive*'. Yet Bouveresse's passion seems blind to his own feelings of rejection and revenge. So, as the other contributors insist, this becomes

philosophy ignorant of the noise of the body from which it generates. Nonetheless one wants to ask just how much that lack of self-consciousness matters when one has real arguments to make about actual conditions. Similarly one wonders just how valuable or plausible is the desire to think against the institution of philosophy and the constraints of representation when it leads so many brilliant performers, despite themselves, to the same mix of Hegel and critical suspiciousness. The critique of institutions has become institutionalized. Perhaps, then, there are precious few alternatives to acknowledging the limits of representation but still trying to get our language fit for work, as free as possible from the noise of the world so that it can perform whatever thinking may ask of it. That we need or can have a 'last thesis defense' may be the worst delusion spawned by a performative culture in which the adulation of crowds in the streets is all too easy to manipulate.

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H A. NIELSEN. *Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments*. Tallahassee University Presses of Florida 1983. Pp. x + 209. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-8130-0742-9.

Nielsen's 'reading' of Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments* began, he tells us, as a study of the extensive contrast between the position it outlines and that taken by Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Due, however, to the conceptual indeterminacy (or 'algebraic' nature) of Kierkegaard's text, and to 'other textual difficulties,' the comparative study gave way to the sufficiently challenging task of shedding 'some light' on these difficulties with the *Fragments*. In effect *Where the Passion Is* is a commentary on Kierkegaard's text and presupposes ready reference to that. The book's nine chapters match Kierkegaard's preface, five chapters, appendix to one of these, the 'interlude' between Chapters IV and V (in the Danish edition the interlude is not, as the Hong translation suggests and Nielsen accepts, part of Chapter IV, but a genuine break in performance), and concluding 'moral'. Each chapter opens with a summary, which is then followed by extensive 'remarks' which seek intelligible interpretations of the radical hypothesis presented by the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus and of the implications spelled out in the body of the work. Nielsen's clarifications and elaborations

probe that area of basic attitudes which are the life-blood of Kierkegaard's writings, and he does full justice to the radicalness of the shift of attitude required by anyone who seriously accepts Climacus's hypothesis as the true situation. Considered as a series of discussions within the philosophy of religion provoked by Kierkegaard's themes, and independently of the light they shed on Kierkegaard's intentions, Nielsen's book is consistently interesting, though leavened with a not always helpful metaphorical form of expression and a raciness of idiom that had me reaching for my Webster as often as for my Hong. Taken as a contribution towards understanding Kierkegaard's themes as Kierkegaard intended, the work is less even. The problem can be traced to Nielsen's initial interpretation of Kierkegaard's intention. He sees in the 'algebraic' nature of the conceptual scheme of the *Fragments* a carte blanche offered to readers of a 'later generation' to fill the appropriate blanks from their own experience and 'adapt their reading to the philosophical nuances of their own age' (x). This can sound plausible in view of Kierkegaard's retrospective insistence that the so-called aesthetic works, among which he numbers the *Fragments*, are addressed to the situations and 'possibilities' of their readers and invite individual interpretation according to circumstance. But Nielsen's interpretation ignores Kierkegaard's own clear indications that his work is geared specifically to the philosophical 'nuances' of the time and place to which he and his readers belonged. This has two important consequences: first, Nielsen deprives the reader of the key which Kierkegaard himself provides for the interpretation of both the purpose and the content of the written text (Kierkegaard says of Climacus's *Concluding Postscript* to the *Fragments* that it was designed to show the way 'back' from Hegel's System and speculative idealism, but Nielsen's index contains no entry for Hegel), and second, he is led to rummage in the rules for combining the blanks into something powerful or flexible enough to cope with the 'nuances' of his own particular philosophical preoccupations or those he presupposes in his reader. The combined result is to place the reader before an artificially exaggerated set of possibilities and to put a far greater philosophical strain on the text than it need be thought to bear. There are advantages in representing Climacus as an unusually resourceful philosopher whose compressed insights can be expanded into fully articulated arguments. One is that it corrects the lazy man's opposite tendency to write Climacus off as a polemicist given to hyperbole and logical legerdemain. Another is to bring Kierkegaard into range of current dispute. It is indeed one of Nielsen's aims to 'show how his work anticipates many twentieth-century problems in the philosophy of religion' (x), though that fact might be due, if not to accident, just as much to the influence of Kierkegaard's thought as to whatever prescience can be recovered from his 'tightly gathered prose' (ix). On the other hand it would serve Kierkegaard ill to foist on Climacus arguments for conclusions that weren't his concern. I believe that Nielsen does this. Rightly insisting that Kierkegaard's intended reader should be able to raise in suitably personal form certain basic questions, Nielsen includes among these one that Kierkegaard's text provides no basis for, namely 'Is it a great or a little thing

to exist as the one I am?' (4) The questions tackled by the *Fragments* and carefully formulated on the title page are concerned with the implications for one's 'eternal happiness' of the possibility that knowledge is limited to history or the finite. To one attuned to the Hegelian background this can be read quite naturally as, 'What are the requirements for acquiring an eternal consciousness and happiness if we assume, against Hegel, that history cannot be seen through the eyes of philosophy as a mirror of the "philosophical notion"?' (cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, Pt 1, §16) If being 'little' means being no more than finite, that possibility is not raised in the *Fragments*, though modern readers may well want to raise it. The jacket blurb says that Nielsen's analysis 'takes into account cultural changes between 1844 and 1984 by reacting to the *Fragments* in ways that express the typical probings and uncertainties of modern readers,' but modishly describing the book as a 'deconstruction' it also says that it 'functions as a replacement text for Kierkegaard's highly condensed original.' The more it does the one, the less it does the other. Nielsen allows Climacian 'error' to embrace ignorance as to *whether* 'my existence as such places a task in my hands' (61), while the text strongly suggests that there being a task is presupposed and the error is to think of it as Socratic, recollective, intellectual. By widening the range of values for Climacus's variables in this way, Nielsen's text does not substitute for Kierkegaard's but puts something else in its place.

Among more particular criticisms, I would draw attention to Nielsen's apparently arbitrary invocation of a Kantian concept of necessity as foil to Climacus's thesis that nothing comes into existence with necessity; his assumption against the evidence of page 14 of the Hong translation that Climacus's statement that a person 'originally in possession of the condition for understanding the Truth . . . thinks that God exists in and with his own existence' refers to a 'pre-Error state', and not simply to the Socratic position, and his use of this same form of expression to refer to the state of having *received* the condition (119), thus collapsing the carefully constructed distinction between the Socratic position and that of the M-hypothesis; his suggestion that the *Fragments* derive their title from the 'patchwork' effect (32) of the sequence of distinct *genres* represented in the chapters (a *thought* project, a piece of poetizing, a 'detour' into philosophical theology, etc.), which is implausible once 'Smuler' is given its more accurate translation as 'Crumbs' or 'Remnants'; his typically exaggerated claims for the intended force of the final sentence of the concluding 'moral' (Also Nielsen mystifyingly describes the opening motto as 'adapted from a German translation of Shakespeare's line "Better well hung than ill wed"', whereas this latter is an accurate rendering of the Danish, which is in turn an accurate rendering of a German translation of Shakespeare's 'many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage.') On the credit side is the author's eagerness to take Climacus's most provocative claims seriously and find interpretations that take the edge of implausibility off them. It is a pity he hasn't availed himself of the Hegelian background in searching for these, and it would be an even greater pity for

that reason if readers were taken in by the blurb's claims for the book as 'a replacement text.'

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FELIX OPPENHEIM, *Political Concepts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. x + 227. US\$5.50. ISBN 0-226-63184-2.

Felix Oppenheim describes his enterprise at the outset of *Political Concepts* as the application of 'the method of contemporary analytical philosophy to an analysis of selected political concepts.' In Oppenheim's hands 'the method of contemporary analytic philosophy' takes the form of attempts at constructing brief formal definitions reminiscent of those Carnap proposed for various basic scientific concepts in papers such as 'Testability and Meaning.' For the most part, however, the similarity with Carnap only extends to style rather than matters of doctrine. Oppenheim explicitly dissociates himself from a great many of the distinctive doctrines of Logical Positivism in the areas of epistemology and theory of meaning.

The first seven chapters of *Political Concepts* concern themselves primarily with the task of defining the terms 'social power,' 'social freedom,' 'egalitarianism,' 'self interest,' and 'public interest.' Oppenheim, however, also contrasts his respective definitions of these terms with those proposed by other writers. In the final two chapters Oppenheim defends his general approach against various theoretical objections. Among the views he argues against in this regard are that political concepts can only be defined 'normatively,' that they are 'essentially contestable' in a sense of this phrase that precludes their formal definition, and that they essentially facilitate 'self understanding' in a way that absolutely rules out a scientific approach to politics. Oppenheim also attempts to state the precise sense in which he believes facts and values are distinct.

Oppenheim's approach naturally invites the question of what uses he intends his formal definitions to serve. The following passage suggests extremely broad objectives in this regard:

To make political concepts suitable for political inquiry it seems to me necessary to reconstruct them, i.e. to provide them with explicative defini-

tions, The proposed explications will be descriptive so that political scientists with differing normative commitments can nevertheless agree, e.g. that a given rule of distribution is egalitarian (but not necessarily just) or a given policy is in the public interest (whether or not it should be enacted) (1)

One really does not know quite how to take the above remark. According to one natural interpretation, Oppenheim seems to urge here that political scientists follow his recommendations for use of the terms he formally defines in *Political Concepts*. But does he mean *all* political scientists in *all* circumstances regardless of their diverse subject matter interests? Such advice would be truly extraordinary. Oppenheim provides nothing near the kind of argument necessary to make it persuasive. Indeed, one wonders what such an argument would look like. Perhaps Oppenheim conceives of his definitions as having some more limited uses. I, however, could find no passages in *Political Concepts* to this effect. A major problem with Oppenheim's formal definitions of political concepts then appears to be that one finds oneself hard pressed to answer the question 'What are they good for?'

As a separate point, the problems attending Oppenheim's definition of one important term — punishment — are so serious it seems that this definition could have no remotely conceivable use. Furthermore, his problems in this regard carry over into his definitions of 'social power' and 'social freedom' because he uses the term 'punishment' in defining them. Oppenheim proposes the following definition of 'punishment':

Definition:

P punishes R for having done *x* iff P believes that R committed offense *x*, and this belief causes P to perform some act *y* with the intention of depriving R (17)

This will not do. Suppose Jones, a private citizen, believes that Smith, another private citizen, is parked illegally, and this belief causes him to let the air out of the tires on Smith's car (in order to teach Smith a lesson). Such does not constitute a case of Jones punishing Smith. Deprivation is not punishment unless imposed by someone in a position of authority. Evidently Oppenheim disagrees with this last point because he provides the following gloss on the above definition of 'punishment':

'... we should remember here ... that P and R are general actor variables. E.g. a child may punish his parents for not having given him a lollipop by staging a temper tantrum.' (17)

This last example is a surprise, to put the point conservatively. Compare, 'I punished my son Johnny yesterday' with 'my son Johnny punished me yesterday.'

Could one patch up Oppenheim's definition of 'punishment' simply with an amendment that P have authority with respect to R? It would seem not.

The concept of authority stands as much in need of explication as does the concept of punishment. Elsewhere in *Political Concepts* Oppenheim proposes a definition of authority. But it does not help. In this regard he writes:

That government P has authority over its citizens R wrt a certain range of their activities means that the latter believe that P is entitled to regulate their conduct within that range and that they themselves have the duty to comply. (22)

Oppenheim thus seeks to define 'authority' in terms of 'entitlement' and 'duty'. But insofar as these three words all march together, it would seem this fails to take one very far.

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PAUL PHILLIPS, *Marx and Engels on Law and Laws*. Law in Society Series, edited by C.M. Campbell and Paul Wiles. Don Mills and New York. Oxford University Press 1980. Pp. xiii + 238. Cdn\$18.50. ISBN 0-85520-355-2 (cloth). ISBN 0-85520-356-01 (paper).

'The objectives of this study are strictly limited,' announces Phillips in the opening lines of the Introduction. 'It is not an attempt to present "the" Marxist theory of law or even "a" Marxist theory of law.' Adhering rather strictly to this self-imposed constraint, the author refuses to be lead into the enterprise of elaborating a Marx/Engels theory of law as an element of the ideology of the ruling class, or 'false consciousness,' or discussing law as a component in a Marxist account of the state in the context of the materialist theory of history, or any of the more usual treatments of Marxism and law which follow most naturally from the original texts. Instead these topics are treated only incidentally as they figure in Phillips' attempt to focus on Marx's and Engels' views about law in a much more routine and empirical sense of the term, as in 'how laws come into being' and 'how they operate in actual practice.'

This choice of objectives has important consequences in terms of the interpretive possibilities inherent in the original source materials. It is not obvious that either Marx or Engels devoted enough sustained intellectual atten-

tion to the phenomenon of law in the sense of the details of the legislative process, law enforcement, adjudication, etc., to support the search for an empirical Marxist sociology of law in this sense. Undeniably, both Marx and Engels made considerable numbers of observations on the impact of particular laws on the working class, on details of legislative politics in various countries, etc., however, to paraphrase two other authors, Maureen Gain and Alan Hunt, who produced a quite similar work (*Marx and Engels on Law*, Academic Press 1979), nowhere did Marx or Engels take law in this sense as a direct object of their study and writing. At the conclusion of Phillips' work it still seems questionable that the original texts should have been viewed as likely to support the search for a consistently developed empirical sociology of law in the absence of any interpolations and extrapolations by sympathetic interpreters, which is approximately what the author seems to have had in mind.

The six divisions of the work treat selected statements by Marx and Engels (1) from the early works, (2) on law and class interests in England, (3) on law and class interests in France, (4) on crime and criminal justice, (5) on economic regulation, and (6) on the relationship between law and society. There is no general concluding chapter (only some concluding remarks less than a page in length concerning the topic of Chapter 6), nor is there an index or a bibliography; there are both chronological and alphabetical lists of works cited however.

The organization of the book is (except for the first chapter on 'Early Works') by topics. Within each general topic (indicated by chapter headings) there are several sub-topics e.g., in the chapter on 'Law and Class Interests, England' there are sub-topics such as pre capitalist legislation, the Reform Bill, the Corn Laws, etc. Within each of these sub-topics the selection of remarks from Marx and that from Engels are usually treated separately; remarks by each author, where appropriate, are selected from a range of texts reflecting variations in views over time on that subject.

The organization of the inquiry as just described forces the author to make do sometimes with rather brief and scattered remarks from the original sources on some of the many topics covered. Phillips' approach throughout is to present a quotation from Marx or Engels, elaborate briefly on various possible interpretations of it, and then criticize its ambiguities, obscurities, apparent contradictions with other views expressed by Marx or Engels, or unexplored implications. The critical effort expended by Phillips sometimes seems out of proportion to the occasionally rather slender quotations from Marx or Engels with which he is dealing. More seriously, the exceedingly close critical attention devoted, one after another, to a great many individual remarks, and the largely inconclusive outcome of the inquiry, may leave the reader wondering what would have been the result of a similar effort devoted to the sympathetic attempt to construct a plausible and coherent Marxist sociology of law on the basis of a more selective interpretation of the source materials.

In any event, such was not the author's intention; as mentioned above he did not intend to present a Marxist theory of law. He is not without a theory of his own however; it appears that the sense of 'law' in terms of which the project was conceived and carried out presupposes the truth of some positivist account of law. For example his frequent invocation of an unexamined distinction between 'the empirical' and 'the normative' in his criticisms of Marx and Engels apparently rules out the possibility that Marx's 'Hegelian' or 'Natural Law' views on law in the early works could be taken seriously. Quotations drawn from the early writings in which Marx or Engels employ non-positivist concepts of law are variously described by Phillips as 'heavily philosophical' (8), 'patently idealist' (23), 'highly philosophical' (14) and the like.

In general this book appears to fall somewhere between the status of a monograph arguing a sustained thesis, and a collation of materials for study. The numerous quotations from Marx and Engels are presented within a continuous text; however the absence of much discussion of a larger theoretical framework and the generally inconclusive results of the survey lead one to suppose that the chief value of the work lies in its compilation of remarks from the original texts, and indeed this does constitute a service for the reader interested in the range of remarks made by Marx and Engels on particular laws and law in general. It should be noted though that in this latter task Phillips has some strong competition in the work by Cain and Hunt mentioned above. Their work presents generally more extensive extracts from the original sources, and presents them separately from the introductory commentary for each section, thus providing a handier and more useful reference book. There has been a useful division of labor between these two enterprises however. Cain and Hunt concentrate on Marx's and Engels' views on law in general, and Phillips' work is strongest on specific laws. The two works might thus be viewed as complementary, together providing a rather extensive reference guide to the original sources.

The editors of Phillips' work should not go unscolded for the unacceptably sloppy typography in the book.

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NICHOLAS RESCHER. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Reality: A Group of Essays*. Washington, DC: University Press of America 1983. Pp. xii + 148. US\$20.75 (cloth ISBN 0-8191-2960-7), US\$9.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-2961-5).

In this volume Rescher collects four essays previously published, and adds an additional three, all of which are on traditional Kantian themes, such as things in themselves, noumenal causality, the constitution of the mind, cognitive systematization, and teleology. Slightly more than half of the book is in print for the first time.

In the first two chapters it is argued that things in themselves are epistemic rather than ontological entities in Kant's thought, and that therefore they cannot take on a genuine causal role in his system. The point is roughly correct, but this is a notoriously thorny context. Unfortunately, in the course of his argument Rescher blurs the important distinctions between thing in itself, noumenon, and transcendental object. Kant *does* sometimes blur these distinctions himself, but more often he preserves a clear role for each entity. And it is only by noting and emphasizing these distinctions that we can learn what is most important about Kant's thought in this area. Recent works by Moltke Gram and W. H. Werkmeister would have permitted Rescher to bring these essays up to date.

In the third essay, Rescher attempts to show that for Kant cognitive necessity is relativized by the factual 'given' of the human mind. His argument requires that, in man, cognitive necessity is relativized in terms of all three elements: sensibility, understanding, and reason. This permits him to draw a close analogy between the perspective of Kant and that of Wittgenstein. But this extreme position is both unnecessary and inappropriate. Since, for Kant, all knowledge begins with experience, it is sufficient to recognize that cognitive necessity is *per force* relative to the given data of sensibility. This permits Kant to retain the rigorous *logical* status of his transcendental analysis of consciousness (worlds apart from Wittgenstein). More relativity than this would eliminate the significance of Kant's project.

In the fourth essay, Rescher's own critique of Paton (on Kant's moral philosophy) tends to bear out this line of thought. In effect, Paton claims that Kant's deduction of the moral law cannot achieve the sort of universality he intends, since it is relativized by being grounded subjectively in the nature of our human reason. Rescher counters by pointing out correctly the difference between the conceptual relations at stake in Kant's deduction (and thus the validity of the moral law) on the one hand, and the applicability of the law to us as rational free agents on the other. Only the latter is relativized, and Kant is proof against Paton's criticism. But Rescher should have seen that the same kind of distinction invalidates some part of his argument in the previous essay. The categories are a purely formal, conceptual scheme which loses its purity (*i.e.*, is relativized) only in virtue of being applied to the spatio-temporal context.

The fifth essay points out that while the tasks of reason, both in its

speculative and in its practical employment, are impossible to complete, nonetheless there are certain important benefits to be derived even from this incapacity of reason. This is an uncontroversial statement of Kant's position.

The final two articles are longer, and treat of cognitive systematization and teleology respectively. Often the same material is dealt with twice, but from slightly different perspectives. On at least five occasions, the same long quotations are repeated — sometimes within the same essay. The style is straight exposition, almost without interpretive comments. Only at the end of each thirty-page article does one recognize that the purpose of both essays is to offer a suggestion for revision of the Kantian perspective along the lines of Rescher's *Methodological Pragmatism*. But this suggestion comes late and is not well-argued. In addition to finding it unconvincing, the reader is inclined to take the argument as evidence for a misunderstanding of Kant, rather than an improvement on his position. One short article combining the two topics in a well-argued synthesis would have served a better purpose than what is offered.

With respect to the book as a whole, there seems to be some justification for grouping the essays together, because they are on related topics. But the lack of coordination and synthesis makes the resulting volume awkward and redundant. There are additional problems. Approximately fifty percent of the text is straight quotation from Kant — at great length. There are many misprints and even grammatical problems which should have been eliminated. The best thing about the book is that it is dedicated to Lewis White Beck; but he deserves a better tribute.

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MARK ROSKILL and DAVID CARRIER *Truth and Falsehood in Visual Images*. Amhurst: University of Massachusetts Press 1983. Pp vii + 145. US\$19.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87023-404-8), US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87023-405-6).

This is an elegant little book, its subject intriguing, and a collaboration between an art historian and a philosopher is to be welcomed. Unfortunately, the work is very disappointing. Roskill, the art historian, and Carrier, the philosopher, eschew the detailed logical argument as being 'dull or overex-

tended' Instead, their essay turns on examples The trouble is that the examples are too remote and the supporting text is often inadequate

The ways in which visual images may be true are set out as follows (ix): 1) An image may 'convey' in a general way something true about the world as a map 'denotes' the fact that the earth is round 2) An image may communicate' an accepted truth or provide corroborative evidence as a photograph testifies to the shooting of Robert F Kennedy 3) An image may 'sum up' or 'show forth' what is generally held to be true as a calendar picture shows 'A man's dog is his best friend' On the other hand, images may show something believed at a particular time as Aubrey Beardsley's drawings show him to be a fop. We can say that this yields the schema X is true of Y. However, the Y is often too far removed and the text which characterizes it is not specific enough.

A striking example of these defects is the Walter Evans photograph of a sharecropper's family in 'Visual Lying' (99-100). We are informed that this photograph was not included in the book for which it was intended, namely, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* It is claimed that this 'suppressed' photograph was more true to the character of the individual family members, their relationship to each other and to their environment than the photographs which were included in Agee and Evans' book. The suppressed photograph shows the family as affectionate, smiling and neatly dressed. There is in actual fact a startling discrepancy between this photograph and those of the members of this family found in *Let Us Now*, but our authors have not provided a photograph from that book for comparison. Furthermore, they have not spelled out the Y, i e., the characters, relationship to each other or to their environment

What this book needs if it is to work on the required intuitive level are straightforward examples. Nowhere do we get the shock of recognition of either truth or falsity. In contrast E H Gombrich's examples, especially in *Art and Illusion*, make their point crisply and give the reader a basis for reflection. As it stands the book cannot appeal to 'historians and philosophers interested in a choice of examples and their implications' (vii).

Presumably, for economic reasons, all the examples are in black and white, but it is odd that the authors do not see the irony of this in the case of Toulouse-Lautrec's color lithograph, *Loie Fuller* (4-5) They say that this abstract work does better to 'encapsulate' Fuller's dancing than would a representational work Their description of this dancing makes it clear that the lithograph depends on color for its full truth Even more odd is the omission of the expressive properties of this work For that matter such properties are never discussed. Surely, this ignores an important dimension of truth and falsity in images. Nelson Goodman's theory may have its weaknesses, but Goodman has provided a way of handling expressive features.

An interesting proposal is undermined by lack of specificity. Roskill and Carrier claim that there is a need for a 'new start in understanding how photographs communicate ...' (94) Required is a 'central framework' which 'should encompass what Gombrich likes about photographs' and how he uses them in relation to painting and what John Berger dislikes about them and the

photographs he considers to be exceptions. Many readers will be able to fill in this paltry schema, but the details are called for in the text itself

A promising conceptual move is vitiated by lack of clarity if not out and out obfuscation. The authors take up Arthur Danto's analogy between 'transparent' and 'opaque' painting and acting. In *Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (162-3), Danto describes Proust's experience of Berma. Instead of seeing great acting, Proust saw Phedre, for Berma made herself into a 'sort of mirror'. These authors cite Shaw's observation that, unlike Duse, Bernhardt 'does not enter into the leading character; she substitutes herself for it.' But substitution is not transparent acting. There is no seeing through her. Roskill and Carrier have redefined 'transparent' to fit Bernhardt's case (23-4). Opaque acting, according to Danto, occurs when the style of acting tends to come between the audience and the character portrayed or, I would suggest when we cannot see through an actress, to the character she portrays. This reworking of the notion of transparency to fit Bernhardt's acting is confusing and does nothing to illuminate when applied to painting (24-5). For instance Manet's third version of *The Execution of Maximillan* is called transparent because the artist 'simply used the materials at his disposal as a point of departure for paintwork'. Where is the seeing through here?

Roskill and Carrier realize that opacity and transparency are relative to a historical period. Further, they do not give place for truth in either type of image. I am simply pointing out that the two concepts are rendered unintelligible by their treatment of them.

Following Gombrich and Berger, photographs and advertisements are discussed in conjunction with paintings. The authors want to overcome the 'hard and fast distinction between serious and popular imagery' (13). They also hope that the book will encourage research into the relationship of both kinds of contemporary imagery to the traditions of fine art.

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NATHAN ROTENSTREICH. *Man and his Dignity*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1983. Pp. 221. US\$23.00 ISBN 965-223-457-5.

A book treating a theme fundamental to western civilization: the evolution of humanity itself as the cornerstone of human concern. The intent of the work

is to underscore this concern, to show how variable the concept of human dignity has been (from the Bible down through Nietzsche, Dewey, Sartre), and finally to incite us, by its own example and by its citation of authorities, to respect our fellow human beings as well as our own being. The slant is conspicuously Kantian, the style doxographic.

An introduction to the philosophic humanism of our tradition, then, I can imagine that most parts of the book stem from lectures delivered to mature students. Whereas Aquinas, Dante, and Calvin quote their sources to focus on bedrock, more recent writers do so to exhibit variegation in growth — and leave the reader with the sense that there is no firm ground at all. For instance, I find interesting Rotenstreich's account of the evolution of humanistic education in the works of Comenius, Kant, Pestalozzi, and Dewey — the question of whether, in raising children and teaching youths, we are basing our efforts on Nature or Art or some Mix (whether the development of the individual or the race is Natural or Artful or both). The recitation of historical opinions leaves me with the sense that the soil itself has lain untilled; in a classroom, on the other hand, the earnestness of the teacher might have the opposite effect. It must be possible to disclose Substance in History. Hegel comes to mind, and I believe (for instance) that Bruno Snell also succeeds. However, an author must then develop his own voice within the printed script, one that foretells the bedrock. Otherwise the reader is left with a tangle of opinions.

The unmitigated defence of humanism — the chronicle makes no effort to account for the critique of humanism which has come into vogue since Heidegger — goads me on to ask what a genuine alternative might propose (naïve faith in evolution assumes that in the Beginning there was simply Darkness). Nowadays, with the obvious threat to humanity — mass destruction and the incessant coverage of it by the media — the opposite of humanism appears to be the wanton exercise of power. Whether or not the endorsement of such exercise stems ultimately from the tradition of humanism itself — from the growing insistence upon affirming human being as the only being, and as requiring expression in power (or in the will to will, as Heidegger argues) — I wonder whether the disjunction 'humanism or barbarism' rightly reflects the quandry of our age.

Every individual (and perhaps every nation, in some figurative sense) must come to realize, at some prolonged and trying period, that substantiation depends upon the way we ourselves are responding to circumstances rather than on the circumstances themselves, whether possessed or envisaged. One comes back, then, to a sense of human worth, and philosophers to reflection on substance as subject (as Hegel put it). Yet human dignity, whether our own or that of our neighbors, remains enigmatic, becomes paradoxical, once we learn that the worth apparently located in human beings, like the halos appearing on the heads of saints in older paintings, retains its truth only so long as it simply symbolizes the worthy individual's affirmation of worth which is not his at all. Show me one who either appears worthy to himself or who adulates another as worthy, and I'll show you one who is fast betraying

human worth. Dignity is an elusive predicate, and to pin it down, to pin it on somebody, seems to destroy it. We can catch sight of it only fleetingly, as in Saint-Exupéry's gardener who, on his deathbed, worries about who will take care of his trees

Socrates set the tone for much of western intellectual effort in claiming and showing that what mattered was not living on but living well. Humanism remained alive, a truly generative force, so long as we could uphold that distinction, that affirmation, and not just as a sentiment. In the last couple centuries, however, the Socratic ranking has met with head-on challenges. Nowadays, in the discussions of abortion, genetic manipulation, euthanasia, and the like (the topic of the book's final chapter), the ranking has been silently reversed. Certainly there is nothing intrinsically wrong with cookbooks and other maintenance manuals. But just as certainly there is something wrong when, in the name of humanism, the questions therein at work come to occupy the spotlight of intellectual work. Historically viewed, the combination is flatly contradictory. Perhaps we need to overcome both terms of the current disjunction in order to approach and eventually face once again the full paradox of man and his dignity.

I have no quarrel with the content of Rotenstreich's book. And that's the source of my own discontent. Can a work focussing on human dignity afford to talk about it in the indicative mood? Must not an essay on worth address us in our worth, *call out* that worth rather than only refer to it? Our greatest humanists (I think, for example, of Socrates, Kant, Emerson, Thoreau, Nietzsche) challenge us: their words ring through history as *Herausforderungen* rather than opinions. The death of humanism sets in precisely as we begin simply to review human worth. The trying question for a scholar, then, i.e., for one who does indeed scan the work of others, is whether he or she can preview the topic as well — keep the preview ahead of the review.

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JEAN ROY. *Hobbes and Freud*. Trans. Th. G. Osler. Toronto: Canadian Philosophical Monographs 1984. Pp. viii + 91. Cdn\$3.00. ISBN 0-919936-02-4.

Roy quotes Philip Rieff for the crucial, shared principle held by Hobbes and Freud: 'man is anarchic and society constrains him.' It is telling that this for-

mulation is infelicitous by its opacity and tendency to mislead. For Hobbes finds society to be created simultaneously with government, whose central expression is the civil law whereas Freud would extend and focus society's power in the more informal medium of culture. Roy's exposition shows that he is aware of this and, prudently, after the quote from Rieff, Roy adds, 'When we compare authors who are so removed from each other in discipline, circumstances, and epoch, we must try to see the shades of meaning which point up the differences within their general similarity.' Yet since this material occurs within the page-and-a-half 'introduction' the reader expects to find, in that slim space, a justification for the study. What Roy seems to have in mind is that, in some more or less sense, Hobbes and Freud share a basic principle or, better, attitude toward the individual's need for restraint by others and, therefore, a comparison of their further agreements and disagreements 'will throw new light on these two great thinkers.' In my opinion this 'new light' does not occur.

Roy is an adequate though not a magistral expositor, that is, though he provides apt and interesting texts, Roy does not show a sufficiently strong grasp of the methodological intentions of the two thinkers to give the proper weight for these snippets, much less to salvage and reform what is true in their thought. To be generous, it may be that the brevity of the book — eighty pages of text — is just too little for the necessary scholarly undertaking.

The circumstances of this book as a translation, in the same monograph series it appeared in French, has given me pause. I've asked myself, why republish it in translation, especially in Canada with its soi-disant bilingualism. Consequently, after writing the previous paragraphs, to test my opinion that despite a general competence of exposition Roy's book is no scholarly contribution, I sent for the three reviews listed in the *Philosopher's Index* of the 1976 French text.

I did receive two of these. They are both lengthy, both positive, one in French and one in English: respectively, Ghyslain Charron in *Philosophiques*, IV, (1977), 35-49 and Alan Montefiore in *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, VII, (1978), 205-10. Of course I do not entirely intend to review the reviewers. Charron's very long review is almost entirely devoted to a selective repeating of Roy: aside from the sort of flattery that is suggested by the length of the repetition, a critical posture is almost entirely to be found in the following two sentences: 'Il (Roy) a d'un autre côté parfaitement accompli son projet qui était de montrer les limites respectives de la perspective freudienne et de la perspective hobbenne dans l'articulation de la psyché et de la société' and 'De par la rigueur de son argumentation et la perspicacité de son interrogation, aussi bien que par la clarté de la pensée et l'élégance de l'écriture, cette monographie me paraît en effet remarquable.'

Whereas Charron's expansive language seems to throw too large a net over such a small fish, Montefiore has given me something to think about. Montefiore takes the sanguine high road at the end of his review by calling the book 'determinedly unpretentious' after previously suggesting, by way of an oxymoron, the difficulty that I perceive as a greater negativity: 'Of course, it

is in a way a very ambitious modesty that seeks to present the essential points of contrast and resemblance between two such complex, widely studied and controversial authors through a selective reading of their texts virtually alone and within so short a space.' The good of this 'very clear book, straightforwardly and unpompously written' for Montefiore is in its being 'an admirable stimulus.'

Now I do not think every stimulus is good. And I do not think this is an admirable stimulus because of the conclusions I reach when I ask 'who is it stimulating?' Since the book adds nothing new or deep for either the Hobbes or the Freud scholar, it does not stimulate them as experts; and Roy is not a stimulus to those who are interested in the relation of political theory to psychology, since the comparison between a seventeenth century and a twentieth century perspective is never theoretically confronted in an evaluative way. What Roy gives us is merely another academic book, so common in its audience proposal that its range is seldom considered a fault; Roy by a surface comparison merely titillates the callow student or amateur browser so that, in rare instances, whatever good comes of this is left to a sturdier engagement of the subject; in a word, it is pulp reading for the academic brow.

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LAWRENCE S. STEPELEVICH and DAVID LAMB Eds *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Humanities Press 1983. Pp. 226. US\$19.95. ISBN 0-391-02823-5.

This collection of fourteen essays puts into book form papers delivered during the 1981 September Oxford Conference, a joint meeting of the Hegel Society of Great Britain and the Hegel Society of America marking the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Hegel's death. The conference has given confirmation to what has been described as a resurgent interest in Hegelianism, even though Hegel's complex metaphysics and almost impenetrable style have led many readers into a misunderstanding of his philosophy or discouraged them from reading him at all.

If students of philosophy, as has been remarked, neglect Hegel at their peril, the serious student should be much less imperiled for having carefully

perused the essays comprising this book researched by authors who are obviously conversant with the themes upon which they write. The overall subject dealt with in *Hegel's Philosophy of Action* addresses itself to one of the most far-reaching aspects of Hegel's philosophy, namely, the question of what may be expected of Hegel's philosophical system when and if it is put into practice. In the text the essays appear in the order in which they were originally presented, but for discussion purposes they may be grouped under three headings: (1) Hegel's theoretical philosophy, (2) Hegel's economic and political philosophy and (3) Hegel's philosophy of history in its possible projection toward action in the future.

The essay 'Hegel's Concept of Action as Unity of *Poiesis* and *Praxis*' by Guy Planty-Bonjour is by far the best attempt at clarifying the various concepts employed by Hegel in order to gain some understanding of the latter's general notion of action, even though exact definitions for the terms employed are not always provided by Hegel himself. Planty-Bonjour is concerned that the classification of action is often reduced to only the theoretical-practical, yielding too sharp a contrast between knowledge and action, an unfortunate simplification omitting Hegel's *Tätigkeit* altogether, a spiritual activity which can be nothing less than pure contemplation. Charles Taylor in 'Hegel and the Philosophy of Action' is not as specific in his treatment and dwells mainly on what he designates as Hegel's qualitative theory of action which allows for a change in the agent himself as set over against the causal view which describes changes in things in the external world.

If the foregoing appears to be of an introductory nature, Murray Greene in 'Cognition as an Act of Freedom' orchestrates upon a theme that goes more to the heart of Hegelian thought. Basing his remarks largely upon Hegel's *Enzyklopädie*, he explains the essential role of freedom in human cognition. All consciousness is seen, not surprisingly, as an active freedom struggle for recognition through the unfolding of experience. After all, not to provide for such freedom of action, even as an act of faith, which it is, would be to reduce our entire cognitive apparatus to the level of an unrelenting mechanism. So also we find Quentin Lauer S.J. in his account of 'Religion and Culture,' followed by a brief commentary by Robert Bernasconi, maintaining that culture or *Bildung* for Hegel can be a means to spiritual growth as long as the human being by his own efforts is able to force himself to the attainment of higher levels and in so doing alienate himself from the natural world.

In his essay 'Hegel's Criticism of the Ethics of Kant and Fichte,' which amounts to almost a diversion, M.J. Petry is by no means the first to call attention to the damaging criticism put forward by Hegel in the *Phänomenologie* against a rigorous morality which hypocritically pretends to close the gap between claim and performance, and which fails to provide for the working out of ethical theory in a societal and institutional setting. 'The *Aufhebung* of Morality in Ethical Life' by Ludwig Siep is really a continuation of Petry's contribution, portraying even more forcefully Hegel's criticism of Kant's deontological ethics. In brief, how can an indeterminate will be the subject of a universal good which is obligatory for all? If the good as such and the value in

it reside in universal law there is very little credit remaining to be given over to the strenuous attempts put forward by the individual in carrying out his specific duties.

Moving into the field of economics proper, 'The Social Ideal of Hegel's Economic Theory' by H.S. Harris is a scholarly if rambling discussion of Hegel's proto-Marxist views based on the early Jena manuscripts. The employment of machine labour is already the issue, and Hegel regards it as a form of work that is neither as morally satisfying nor as economically rewarding as hand labour. Hegel, it is contended, looked forward to a socio-economic revolution that would put an end to what he considered to be the unfair industrial marketing of labour. Writing on 'Hegel Individual Agency and Social Context,' A S Walton turns to the controversial issue of the state versus the individual. While Walton admits the difficulties involved, he is constrained to stress in a manner that is uncharacteristically Hegelian the centrality of the agent in the social context. Individuality alone is surely the very entity that Hegel is concerned not to champion, for he hardly ceases to lay stress upon the all-important role of institutional life as the essentially formative influence in the life and growth of the individual. In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel repeatedly emphasizes the dependence of the individual upon the state, and it is not evident that for Hegel action stems from individual initiative alone. Errol E. Harris under the heading 'Hegel's Theory of Political Action' comes closer to the mark when he notes that the objectification of a self-determined freedom can only be found in political action realizable in social and institutional organization.

One further matter concerning political action is raised in 'Freedom as Interaction: Hegel's Resolution of the Dilemma of Liberal Theory' by Richard D. Winfield. At the outset the author renders a superbly detailed analysis of the particularity of the human will. But it is evident that political affairs regulated by a universal principle of justice would violate the very freedom unique to the will possessing self-determination. Hegel was critical of the traditional view of natural right to liberty sustained by contract, and his own solution in the *Philosophy of Right* is that justice must be achieved, if at all, in terms of the existing interaction of a plurality of free wills. Abstract Right for Hegel is a nonnatural right between persons.

Walter Jaeschke in 'Hegel's Last Year in Berlin' tells of Hegel's ventures into journalistic philosophy including his ill-considered criticism of the English Reform movement wherein Hegel seems to think that his own arguments for rational law would be sufficient to usher in an improved system of rights. Thereupon Raymond Plant asks 'Is There a Future in the Philosophy of History?' and defends Hegel's apparently arrogant assumption that the German World stands at the end of all history by suggesting that we recognize only the intimation of history thus achieved. This 'foreclosure of the future' may be thought of as a necessary condition for any worthwhile subsequent philosophy of history. The disturbing thought that Hegel might nevertheless imply by this an end to history altogether in the absence of any ongoing freedom to realize the potential for a transcendent self is alleviated somewhat

in a final contribution by Lawrence Stepelevich, 'Between the Twilight of Theory and the Millennial Dawn.' The Hegelian system as it stands must be made the start of a new Hegelian praxis, since to settle for history as simply a retrospective activity would be to deny for Hegel the dynamics of Spirit. What is left for the future is the development of truth in the philosophy of concrete activity, not by foreclosing upon Absolute Knowledge itself, but by continuing in the conscious practice of this knowledge, even though it has been in some respect already intentionally achieved as an end.

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NATHAN TARCOV. *Locke's Education for Liberty*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1984. Pp. viii + 272. US\$22.00. ISBN 0-226-78972-1.

Tarcov's aim is 'to broaden and deepen our views of both Locke and liberalism by taking *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* seriously as more than a practical handbook for parents' (vii). He argues that Locke's 'egoistic and hedonistic psychology' does not lead to a 'degraded' human life 'bereft of any dignity' but, instead, is the 'basis' on which Locke 'constructs modern moral virtues, including civility, liberality, justice, and humanity' (210).

The main strength of this study is its sympathetic interpretation of many of the *Thoughts*' sub-themes from the kindred perspective of late twentieth-century liberalism, an interpretation which often issues in a vigorous and fair statement of Locke's conclusions. A good example here is Tarcov's handling of the related concepts 'mastery' and 'liberality.' The desire for mastery he shows to be both a virtue and a vice: a virtue when 'turned rationally inward against one's own passions, appetites, and inclinations,' a vice when 'turned willfully outward over others and for doing what one pleases' (90). This vice manifests itself in two desires: 'desire for the submission of others to one's will' and 'desire for property' (132). About the latter Tarcov adds that 'what Locke is opposing here is not the desire for property as such but the desire for property as power over others.' (Thus the *Thoughts* is kept from conflict with the *Second Treatise*). In the section on 'Liberality' Tarcov deepens this analysis, arguing that Lockean education leads to the 'replacement' of the desire for dominion as a potentially destructive 'contest for mastery' by a 'contest of civility, a useful form of competition' (142). Tarcov is at his best

when he deals with these sub-themes of the *Thoughts*, with concepts such as mastery, civility, liberality, justice, humanity.

He is, however, at his worst with respect to problems about the question of how, through education, one is to acquire characteristics like civility or liberality. That is not because he misinterprets Locke in this crucial respect but because he neglects it altogether. He deals extensively with the effects education is supposed to produce, but ignores the tension inherent in the discussion of how education is to produce these effects. It is not as if Tarcov does not recognize the relevance of an examination of the actual process of education: he is aware of its importance but abdicates responsibility for it (198-9). As a result the book becomes superficial and uncritical precisely where the need for depth and evaluation is paramount. Locke holds that education occurs through the habituation of a being who is epistemically autonomous. The question of how one is 'to set the mind right, that on all Occasions it may be disposed to consent to nothing, but what may be suitable to ... a rational Creature' (86-7) contains the problem of how habituation can enhance the freedom inherent in rationality. It is the central problem of the *Thoughts*. It cries for attention in this study, notably on pages 88, 93, 98, 101, 108, 111. It is an overstatement to say that 'A thorough examination of ... the pedagogical methods to be employed in the intellectual part of education, which occupies so much of the *Thoughts*, would require another study' (198). Tarcov could have written a work no longer than that now produced and have done justice to this central dimension which (as he rightly said) 'occupies so much of the *Thoughts*.'

He could have done so by drastically shortening the first, by far the longest, chapter. That chapter contains much historical detail which might well have found its way into the footnotes of the other chapters, where much of this kind of material is already present anyhow. In addition it contains a good deal of historical background which is simply not (made) relevant to Locke. I am all for placing thinkers in their historical context. I even believe that doing so is necessary for correct interpretation. On the other hand, the context must be (made) relevant. In the case at hand, one would lose nothing germane were one to skip large chunks of this chapter, for example, at least pp 11-19 and 22-33. That is, one can with impunity disregard material equivalent in length to the fourth chapter.

In spite of this central weakness Tarcov's is not an unrewarding book. It is very useful on the results education is supposed to achieve. It is of value especially because of the good utilization of Locke's other works to illuminate the *Thoughts*. (Occasional lapses therefore stand out all the more conspicuously: as on p. 97, where the discussion of 'present Pleasure or Pain' clearly needs to be complemented by the *Essay's* Book 2, chapter 21; and on p. 106, where the statement that 'according to Locke, unassisted reason knows nothing either of divine reward and punishment or of the next life' contradicts at least the intent of the *Essay's* 2.21.70). It deserves praise for the excellent use made of secondary sources (although the absence of references to Passmore's work on Locke is astonishing). It is written in a clear and forth-

right style, albeit that Tarcov's penchant for infelicitous alliteration ('... reasoning ... will be more pleasant for reasonable parents than pert prattle,' 174) did begin to grate on my nerves.

On the jacket flap Tarcov's book is recommended as 'An outstanding study that will become the leading authority on its subject ...'. On the whole, the book is not outstanding; it is therefore to be hoped that a worthier study will take the place of 'leading authority.' Hall and Woolhouse are still correct: 'there is room for a book assessing ... the content ... of Locke's educational thought in a more definitive manner' (*Eighty Years of Locke Scholarship*, Edinburgh 1983, 4).

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